Posted by
OnceAlwaysaMarine on Thursday, November 13, 2008 2:40:43 AM
Having read with much interest, Peter Singer's article, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, I will concede that I agree with some of his basic assumptions. However, I find myself in disagreement with others. For instance, who can disagree with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad? The next point he makes in his writing: "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it," is equally uncontroversial. I agree, therefore, with Singer's fundamental premise. What I do not agree with, however, is how he defines the extent to which we are morally obligated to contribute to these efforts at relief.
I do not support his premise that we are obligated by duty to sacrifice or donate that which we possess above which is necessary to our own survival. I believe that more good is achieved, and more people are helped from charitable actions based upon appeals made to human compassion than will ever possibly come from any attempt at making an argument that one ought to give away [or have confiscated] his or her earnings out of a moral sense of duty [or as posited by our new vice-president elect Joe O'Biden] "patriotism." In fact, I consider Singer's entire premise to be another argument for Socialism, except in this instance he would have it apply globally.
Professor Singer argues: "Because giving money is regarded as an act of charity, it is not thought that there is anything wrong with not giving. The charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned." This, to me, depends upon the premise that in Mr. Singer's opinion, we are to assign ourselves as the judges of others. I'm not sure it is my place to condemn anyone, however, I am of the opinion that there is a certain devolution of moral obligation in standing idly by and failing to contribute to ameliorating the obvious and tangible pressing needs of others. I also agree that to refrain from doing so cannot be justified by shifting the focus from oneself onto how many others may or may not be sacrificing to a comparable degree. However, I feel each man or woman must make their choice individually as to what percentage of wealth they can personally afford to contribute on the behalf of others. To be sure, circumstances vary from individual to individual and from family to family so that one's contribution may not match another's.
If Professor Singer's treatise serves as a provocation to those of us in society who have in our own affluence, become either too complacent, blind to the needs of those less fortunate, or worse still, greedy and uncaring, then I think there may be some resultant willingness to help on the part of those who are capable of being moved into a sense of duty. After all, poverty, starvation, and famine still exist in our world today, some thirty-six years after this critique was written and the appeal made.
I suppose the traditional distinction between duty and charity should be set aside when dealing with the monumental scale of human suffering we are witnessing in underdeveloped nations around the world even now in the 21st century. Contributions to charity are a noble and necessary help to those in need but does not, at least in our cultural understanding of the word, imply the moral imperative towards participation that duty does. Further, an argument can be made that if the world's societies would have begun to address the issues of famine, affluence and morality all those years ago, using the template set forth by Professor Singer, such large-scale human suffering might not be existent today.
Personally, I believe I can agree with the substance of Professor Singer's point of view. "Given the present conditions in many parts of the world, it does follow from my argument that we ought, morally, be working full time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine or other disasters. Of course, mitigating circumstances can be adduced--for instance, that if we wear ourselves out through overwork, we shall be less effective than we would otherwise have been. Nevertheless, when all considerations of this sort have been taken into account, the conclusion remains: we ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance."
Singer's is an argument against us continuing according to the status quo. In this I find no argument with him. If we are to succeed in stemming the tide of human misery in the world's populations we may have to reassess whether this can be achieved through "generosity" on our parts or a deeper commitment to fulfilling the duty we have to love our neighbors as we love ourselves.
What man can place himself in the position of judging the charitable acts of another as not being morally adequate? Charity, as defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary is: 1. Christian love (a): the virtue or act of loving God with a love that transcends that for creatures and of loving others for the sake of God 2. (a): the kindly and sympathetic disposition to aid the needy and suffering: liberality to the poor, to benevolent institutions, or to worthy causes." As immoral as it may seem that not everyone lives by these principles, I would argue that it would be less of a moral or ethical approach to the problem; the attempting, through appealing to a sense of duty to correct the situation and solve the problem of starvation, lack, and suffering without first attempting to appeal to people's charitable instincts; thus, making a case for the exercising of brotherly love as an impetus for providing aid to those, for whatever reasons, find themselves in less fortunate circumstances. I think attempting to coerce individuals into the belief that it is their moral [or patriotic] obligation to assimilate into some form of global communism is a non-starter in the United States of America, as it should be for all those who value and cherish their own liberty.
Singer writes: "It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep us warm, To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act which philosophers and theologians have called "supererogatory"--an act which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so."
Again, I disagree. Supererogation according again to Webster's Third New International Dictionary is: "the act or process or an instance of performing more than is required by duty or obligation specifically: the performance beyond what is considered by the Roman Catholic Church to be necessary for salvation of good deeds of the kind believed to have been done by the saints or to be capable of being done by men."
I remain convince [in spite of the impending wave of Socialist philosophical thought now being ushered in with the new Obamanation in Washington D. C.] that the American people will act in charitable and supererogatory ways when called upon to do so. Indeed, I might argue that it is our moral and patriotic duty to do so. I, too, agree with Singer's conclusion that: "we ought to prevent as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance."
I will defend nevetheless, the right, however, of each American man or woman to be his or her own judge in deciding what is the ethical, moral, or patriotic way to do so.
Reference
Singer, P. (1972). Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 pp. 229-243 [revised edition]. Retrieved November 13, 2008 f rom the Internet http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1972----.htm